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Regular Soybeans: Translation and Framing
in the Ontological Politics of a Coup
KREGG HETHERINGTON*
ABSTRACT
This paper argues for understanding the regulation and
standardization of objects as fundamentally about "adding" to those
objects rather than reducing or simplifying them. The analysis is based
on the ethnographic study of regulatory politics in Paraguayan soybean
production over the course of two decades in which the Paraguayan state
increased its regulatory capacity immensely. By looking at very different
forms of regulatory intervention, it shows that each regulatory moment
can best be understood as a "translation" which adds to the complexity of
the objects in question by adding new actors and concerns to their
circulation. This provides a more dynamic way of understanding the
politics of regulation than more common approaches that see regulation
as technical and depoliticizing.
* Kregg Hetherington is professor of Anthropology at Concordia University in
Montreal. He has a PhD in Sociocultural Anthropology from the University of California,
Davis (2008). Since 2002, he has conducted ethnographic fieldwork in Paraguay. His work,
exemplified by the book Guerrilla Auditors (Duke University Press 2011), explores the
relationship between activist politics and law. The research on which this paper is based
took place between 2010 and 2012, and involved extensive fieldwork and interviewing
among state regulators and farmers during the administration of President Fernando
Lugo (2008-2012). This paper would not have been possible without the generosity and
openness of many farmers and functionaries in Paraguay, particularly those working in
SENAVE. Marco Castillo, Alejandra Estigarribia, and Sofia Espindola helped with the
research in Asunci6n, which was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada. The paper itself is the direct result of the provocations and
conversations of the conference "Regulatory Translations: Expertise and Affect in Global
Legal Fields" (May 16-18, 2013), organized by Bogazigi University, Indiana Journal of
Global Legal Studies, and Rice University. I am indebted to all those who participated,
and particularly to Andrea Ballestero, Umut Tiurem, and Fred Aman for their generous
invitation and later comments.
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INTRODUCTION'
In the last two decades, soybeans have become one of the world's
most dominant food crops, carpeting vast swaths of arable land while
insinuating themselves, often in disguise, into an astonishing variety of
foods. 2 Like any dominant global commodity, soybeans have also
assembled new and powerful networks around themselves.3 This is
nowhere more apparent than in Paraguay, a country for which soy
production accounts for roughly fifty-five percent of the value of
exports.4 Beginning in the late 1990s, when agriculture and trade were
very loosely regulated and Paraguay's economy was in crisis, soy began
a ferocious expansion in the countryside, rebuilding the economy and
the landscape around itself. Only in 2004 did the Paraguayan
government seriously begin to intervene in the sector, attempting to
regulate the expansion, to facilitate trade while checking its harms. For
a government like Paraguay's, with a weak tax base, poor
infrastructure, and a lack of technical expertise, asserting a regulatory
presence was a major undertaking that came to generate front-page
political intrigue and contributed to the recent fall of a government. The
regulatory controversies surrounding soybeans, I'll argue here, are best
understood by treating regulation as a form of ontological translation
that multiplies, rather than contains, the objects of regulation.
1. In this article, if no specific citation is provided, the referenced facts were based on
either anonymous interviews or the author's long involvement in the field.
2. See Sidney W. Mintz et al., introduction to THE WORLD OF SOY 1, 1-23 (Christine
M. Du Bois et al. eds., 2008) (Sing.) (discussing how many of the most common processed
food additives, like lecithin, are derived from soybean oil; and considering that since meat
started to be produced in factories and feedlots, soybeans have become one of the primary
ingredients of livestock feed).
3. The phrasing here is deliberate. Part of what makes entities like beans so fickle to
regulate is that the networks of relations that are assembled around them are not
obviously made by people. That is, when beans arrive, the world changes, whether people
intend it to or not. Throughout this paper I use the term "network" to describe this kind of
process, alluding to the "actor-network theory." For a broad introduction to the actor-
network theory, see JOHN LAW, AFTER METHOD: MESS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
(2004) and BRUNO LATOUR, REASSEMBLING THE SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO ACTOR-
NETWORK-THEORY (2005). For a broad discussion of this way of understanding non-human
entities, see JANE BENNETr, VIBRANT MATTER: A POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF THINGS (2010).
4. See OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, THE SOY MIRAGE: THE LIMITS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: THE CASE OF THE COMPANY DESARROLLO AGRICOLA DEL PARAGUAY, 16






This paper will follow three moments of regulatory change that,
over the course of a decade, translated Paraguay's excessive mega-crop.
Soybeans are excessive not only in their expanse but in the complexity
of the assemblage they drag into being. They are ontologically excessive,
hard to get a handle on, and hard to bring into line with specific political
positions and policy goals. In fact, because soybeans are already beings
of complex ecological, political, and economic entanglements, and those
working in the regulatory vein are always making new connections,
soybeans subject to regulation are more rather than less complex.
Regulations may temporarily manage to stabilize soybeans for the
purpose of creating new connections, but, on the whole, they merely add
to the vibrancy and multiplicity of the objects, potentially rendering
them more volatile.5 I argue that focusing on those regulatory
interventions that cause objects to proliferate helps us to reposition one
of the most common analytic tropes about regulation in both its
normative and critical versions-the framework. Part of the problem
with the idea of regulation as framing is that it emphasizes regulation's
role in limiting objects and processes. And yet, limitation is only a small
part of what regulations accomplish. If, by contrast, we see regulation as
primarily additive, we can get a very different, and I would argue a
more helpful, purchase on the politics of regulation.
In Paraguay, the multiplicity and volatility of regulatory objects was
perhaps most obvious after a "parliamentary coup" in 2012 that was
very much about who and what could participate in the regulation of
soybeans.6 In national elections in 2008, the conservative Colorado
Party was defeated for the first time in sixty-one years by an unlikely
coalition of the pro-market Liberal Party and leftist activists, including
environmentalists and peasant groups that had coalesced around the
charismatic leadership of Fernando Lugo, a defrocked left-wing bishop.7
Lugo's experiment with social democracy was very tepid by most
standards. Nonetheless, most conservatives and elites in Lugo's country
reviled him, and, after four years of suffering his presence, they finally
organized his ouster last June.8 Strangely, it seemed at the time, the
5. This discussion of the "excessiveness of things," is inspired by Jane Bennett's work
on the irreducibility of vibrant matter. JANE BENNETT, VIBRANT MATTER: A POLITICAL
ECOLOGY OF THINGS (2010).
6. The term "parliamentary coup" is used by critics to describe what was in fact a
highly irregular impeachment process that its proponents argue was constitutional, but
which drew widespread condemnation in the region.
7. Hugh O'Shaughnessy & Edgar V. Ruiz Diaz, The Priest of Paraguay: Fernando
Lugo and the Making of a Nation, 30 BULL. OF LATIN AM. RES. 100-101 (2010).
8. Most tellingly, the coup was made possible by fission in his coalition, between those
who promoted building up the regulatory infrastructure to facilitate trade, and those who
saw regulation as primarily about protecting citizens.
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attack on Lugo's government centered on a low-profile, foreign-educated
environmentalist named Miguel Lovera, whom Lugo had named as head
of the phytosanitary regulation agency, Servicio Nacional de Calidad y
Sanidad Vegetal y de Semillas (SENAVE). 9 Overnight, SENAVE went
from being an invisible agency concerned primarily with measuring the
purity of plant material and agrichemicals to being the target of a
concerted two-year propaganda campaign that increased until Lugo was
deposed. At the center of the campaign to vilify Lovera and oust Lugo
was a formidable organization called the Union de Gremios Productivos
(UGP), made up of spokespeople for the soybean industry.
When I first started asking Lovera's team why they thought the
UGP's attacks were so vicious, most claimed that SENAVE presented
two dangers: it could limit profitable agricultural practices of the
industry, and it could reveal its illegal practices.10 This story makes
some sense: as with everything else in Paraguay, the soy industry grew
up relying on contraband chemicals and seeds, questionable and
dangerous labor practices, violent land acquisitions, a lack of
environmental controls, and the bribery of police and inspectors. But
this only takes us so far. In fact, the industry itself had lobbied for the
creation and professionalization of SENAVE to make the soy sector
more transparent to international partners. The UGP had not only
willingly limited some of these practices; it also paid for the service.
Moreover, neither before nor after Lovera's appointment did SENAVE
ever produce damning large-scale evidence of industry wrongdoing or of
the overall harmfulness of soy cultivation, and no one ever questioned
the data produced by the agency under Lovera. This was neither a fight
about limitation nor about information. It was, I suggest, a fight over
what Lovera's team had done to soybeans by becoming part of their
network.
I. FRAMING AND TRANSLATING
My evocation of the irreducible ontology of soybeans is meant as
both a statement about regulation itself and a methodological caution
about how we critique governmental processes. The dominant trope in
thinking about regulation is the "framework," a practice of limiting,
containing, and disciplining. I suggest that we might open up the
concept of the framework by extending Michel Callon's provocative work
9. National Plant and Seed Health and Quality Service.
10. This paper is based on three years of intermittent fieldwork in SENAVE and other
agencies related to soy regulation in Paraguay, which is still ongoing.
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on the performance of markets." Callon argues that markets are
constructed through acts of "enframing," and such acts include the work
of economists who describe them. For Callon, economists do not stand
outside their objects of study, but as translators enroll themselves into
the network of the market themselves. Such regulatory interventions
may be limiting (a frame's purpose is after all to exclude, i.e. to "cut the
network"12 of possible associations), but they are also additive, since
they produce a set of relationships that was not there before, including
the relationship with economists. The same could be said of the
inspectors, environmentalists, crop scientists, and epidemiologists who
try to produce knowledge about soybeans. One reason this is important
is that the sociology of regulation often falls into the descriptive rut of
defining regulatory politics as the battle over the contexts of activities
and objects imagined to be separate from what they contain. This is true
both of normative approaches to regulation and critical ones that see
regulation as disciplinary or exclusionary and thereby proceed by
playing one frame (the one presumed to be enacted by the regulator)
against another (some larger context, often called "the social" or "the
environment").
At times, of course, these approaches are both useful and
appropriate. But the closer one gets ethnographically to the people
involved in regulation, the less it seems to make sense to understand
regulation as mere boundary-making. This raises both an analytic and a
political quandary. The problem was quite explicit when people like
Lovera-who had spent his professional life critiquing the government
from without-became part of Lugo's government between 2008 and
2010. Many of these people initially felt that the position would give
them a chance to curtail the most savage aspects of capitalism and
environmental predation; that is, regulation would be an extension,
maybe even an operationalization (however incomplete) of their critical
work. Predictably, many wondered whether they would be
compromising their principles by becoming part of the process and
breaching the distance from power that had once made it possible to
vociferously critique the state. Not unlike the standard-setters Yasmine
Chahed described in her contribution to this volume, activists-turned-
functionaries in Lugo's government found themselves worrying about
the line between radical critique and bureaucratic innovation. Having
endured the suppression of their ideas and values by Alfredo
Stroessner's dictatorship during the Cold War and disappointment in
11. See MICHEL CALLON, Introduction: The embeddedness of economic markets in
economics, in THE LAWS OF THE MARKETS 1-57 (Michel Callon ed., 1998).
12. See Marilyn Strathern, Cutting the Network, 2 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST.
517, 522 (1996).
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the meager democratic transition that followed his ouster but left his
Colorado Party in power, activists spent the next two decades as
vociferous and active critics of anything the government did.13 The
outcome of the 2008 election, and the appointment of many of these
people to important civil service jobs, required activists to engage in a
certain degree of intellectual reflection and rethinking. As one such new
civil servant told me in 2010, "[I]t was hard at first. We'd all be sitting
around the table and people would start denouncing the government
like we all do. And then someone would have to say, yeah, but wait a
second, we are the government now. What are we going to do about
it?"14
That simple question, familiar to so many progressives who, at some
point, have either lost faith in, or actually experienced, a much-hoped-
for revolution, is very similar to the analytic moment that gave rise to
the sociology of translation in the 1980s. For Callon, the repudiation of
critique as mere negation and destruction requires a new way of
accounting for, and engaging with, power.1 s In an early iteration of this
argument, Callon and Bruno Latour insist succinctly, "In order to grow
we must enrol [sic] other wills by translating what they want and by
reifying this translation in such a way that none of them can desire
anything else any longer." 16 So while Paraguayan bureaucrats and
activists do not use the concept of "translation" to describe what they do,
I suggest that the way they operated and thought under Lugo's mandate
was quite similar to Callon's approach.17 It began with the realization
13. See KREGG HETHERINGTON, GUERRILLA AUDITORS: THE POLITICS OF TRANSPARENCY
IN NEOLIBERAL PARAGUAY 25-65 (2011) (elaborating my analysis of this group of
intellectuals, showing how much the disappointment with democratic reforms shaped their
analysis of government and society between 1989 and 2008).
14. This quote comes from an anonymous interview with one of the top civil servants in
SENAVE. The interview was conducted in person outside of the office (though during
work hours) in July 2010.
15. Michel Callon, Why Virtualism Paves the Way to Political Impotence: A Reply to
Daniel Miller's Critique of The Laws of the Markets, ECON. Soc. EUR. ELEC. NEWSL., Feb.
2005, at 3-20.
16. Michel Callon & Bruno Latour, Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: How Actors Macro-
Structure Reality and How Sociologists Help Them to Do So, in ADVANCES IN SOCIAL
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 296 (Aaron Victor Cicourel & K. Knorr-Cetina eds., 1981).
17. The implication here is that there is a historical reason why the sociology of
translation becomes prominent toward the end of the Cold War, and why it is still useful
for describing regulatory practices in the present. Given more space it would be nice to
explore how the concept of translation itself has shifted in social theory from its early
association with critical theory to its more common uses now in actor-network theory. The
early accusation that ANT is apolitical parallels quite closely the worry among activists
that they could not work for the state without being coopted. Ballestero's paper in this
collection complexifies the question somewhat, by showing how a critical notion of
translation (Walter Benjamin's) can also be used to arrive at a very similar sense of
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that the powerful relationship between state regulators and agrarian
capitalists did not primarily operate by suppressing oppositional voices,
as it arguably had during the Stroessner years. Instead, regulators and
capitalists worked together by translating other interests into the
creation of new, stronger assemblages. It followed that they needed to
do the same to use government to create positive change.
The following analysis adds another layer to this parallelism by
retelling some of the history of soybeans as a series of translations,
following the objects on which regulation is supposed to operate. Each of
these moments begins with soy as a complex and multiple assemblage
and then shows how those assemblages are converted with the help of
particular kinds of regulatory actors.' 8 Unsurprisingly, in each of these
moments of translation, we find particular sorts of human characters
acting as mediators who, not unlike the Sultan of Johor in Iza Hussin's
account, produce novel associations out of their own interstitial
positions:' 9  Brazilian migrants in Paraguay, foreign-educated
technicians, and activist bureaucrats. Some of these translations are
quite explicit, as in the attempts by national and international
organizations to create new information-sharing networks. Others are
much less so, like the implicit arbitraging of regulatory differences
between Brazil and Paraguay carried out by migrants.
Insofar as each translation offers a moment for defining soybeans as
singular, it also opens up new ways of appreciating them as plural, and,
therefore, opening up new forms of association and new political
possibilities. Indeed, built into the very concept of translation is the idea
that two things can be the same while different. 20 Each regulatory
translation, far from reducing the complexity of the soybeans, only
regulation's additive qualities. See generally Andrea Ballestero, What Is in a Percentage?
Calculation as the Poetic Translation of Human Rights, 21 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 27
(2014). I don't resolve these tensions here but point them out as an interesting
ethnographic field in which regulators work and anthropologists study them.
18. On "assemblage converters," see GILLES DELEUZE & FtLIX GUATIARI, A THOUSAND
PLATEAUS: CAPITALISM AND SCHIZOPHRENIA 324-25 (Brian Massumi trans., Athlone Press
1988) (1980); BENNETT, supra note 3, at 42.
19. See MICHEL CALLON, Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication of
the scallops and the fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay, in POWER, ACTION AND BELIEF: A NEW
SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE? 196, 204 (John Law ed., 1986) (explaining how the
interdefinition of actors brings the addition of human actors, the fisherman and scientists,
into the story); see also BRUNO LATOUR, REASSEMBLING THE SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO
ACTOR-NETWORK-THEORY, 108 (Oxford University Press 2005) (explaining how
translations between mediators may generate associations). See generally Iza Hussin,
Misreading and Mobility in Constitutional Texts: A Nineteenth Century Case, 21 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 145 (2014).
20. See TIMOTHY K. CHOY, ECOLOGIES OF COMPARISON: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF
ENDANGERMENT IN HONG KONG 94 (2011).
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produces new kinds of assemblages; indeed, it creates new kinds of
soybeans. Soybeans are plants, food, and industrial raw materials. They
are the vehicles of intellectual property rights and the means of
arbitraging regulatory environments. They are the carriers of pests and
dependents of pesticides. And they are both green gold and heinous
land-occupiers. Each of these soybeans is an assemblage of regulatory
relationships, which overlap but are not quite the same. It is in this gap
of not-quiteness that regulatory politics is at its fiercest.
Regulatory politics is, therefore, very much an ontological politics. 21
A well-known example of this comes from Annemarie Mol's description
of medical practices in a Dutch hospital.22 Mol shows that the medical
phenomenon we know as "atherosclerosis" is never more than a
tenuously coordinated overlap between different objects produced by
quite different premises and instruments.23 By eschewing the
ontological reduction that would bring atherosclerosis into anything but
momentary focus, Mol offers a subtle example for the study of more
high-stakes variants of ontological politics, such as the regulation of a
legume that is both an economic bonanza and a harbinger of death.24
Regulation never resolves this multiplicity. Instead, with each new
attempt to contain soybeans, it produces a new soybean, partially
connected to old soybeans.25
II. FIRST TRANSLATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON THE FRONTIER
Soybeans are a technically demanding crop with a key role in the
reorganization of modern agriculture the world over throughout the
twentieth century. 26 They are grown for industrial processing to produce
21. See Annemarie Mol, Ontological Politics. A Word and Some Questions, in ACTOR
NETWORK THEORY AND AFTER 74, 74-75 (John Law & John Hassard eds., 1999).
22. ANNEMARIE MOL, THE BODY MULTIPLE: ONTOLOGY IN MEDICAL PRACTICE (2002).
23. Id.
24. See Kregg Hetherington, Beans Before the Law: Knowledge Practices, Responsibility,
and the Paraguayan Soy Boom, 28 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 65, 67 (2013).
25. For the concept of the partial connection, I draw on Strathern's discussion of
objects that are "neither singular nor plural, neither one nor many, a circuit of connections
rather than joint parts." See MARILYN STRATHERN, PARTIAL CONNECTIONS 54 (1991); see
also Marisol De La Cadena, Indigenous Cosmopolitics in the Andes: Conceptual Reflections
Beyond "Politics," 25 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 334, 347 (2010) (applying "partial
connection" to an examination of Latin American indigeneity as a complex and political
formation that is "more than one, but less than two").
26. For overviews of the importance of soybeans to changes in global agricultural
regulation during the 20th century, see generally TOWARDS A NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF AGRICULTURE 1 (William Friedland, et al. eds., 1991); DU BOIS, supra note 2, at 1;
JACK RALPH KLOPPENBURG, FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLANT
BIOTECHNOLOGY, 1492-2000 1 (University of Wisconsin Press, 2d ed. 2004)(1988); RAJ
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oils, feeds, additives of all sorts, and most recently fuel. As a result, the
commodity chain that soybeans articulate between breeders, producers,
marketers, processors, and consumers is exceptionally long: behind
every soybean is an array of political, corporate, chemical, and
environmental interests. In Brazil and Argentina, Paraguay's two
largest neighbors, soybean infrastructural development began in the
1930s, and, by the 1970s, the beans were planted on a large scale as
part of sophisticated, state-run modernization schemes. 27 Paraguayan
agriculture was completely different, centered on the smallholder
production of cotton, a crop that could be easily farmed with few tools
and with little infrastructure. 28 Soybeans entered the country quietly in
1976, carried in and planted at a relatively small scale alongside other
crops by impoverished migrants from Brazil who had been displaced by
land concentration in their own country. 29
By the 1990s, cotton and soybeans were equally important as export
crops, together accounting for most of domestic production.3 0 The two
crops belonged to two different territories and populations and had
completely different relationships with the national government.
Cotton, planted in departments nearest to Asunci6n by smallholder
"campesinos,"'1 was entirely connected to the Paraguayan Ministry of
Agriculture. 32 Soybeans, by contrast, had little to do with government at
all and were still primarily planted by Brazilian migrants living in the
PATEL, STUFFED AND STARVED: MARKETS, POWER AND THE HIDDEN BATTLE FOR THE WORLD
FOOD SYSTEM (2007) 173-220.
27. See Ivan Sergio Freire de Sousa & Rita de CAssia Milagres Teixeira Vieira,
Soybeans and Soyfoods in Brazil, With Notes on Argentina, in THE WORLD OF SOY, supra
note 2, at 234, 236, 245, 251.
28. For a while, tobacco was almost as important as cotton for the rural economy. For
the sake of simplicity, I will not discuss Paraguay's gigantic ranching sector, which is
intimately tied into this whole story. Before the introduction of soybeans, large-scale land
use was primarily dedicated to ranching and logging, and a good deal of the current
expansion of soybeans takes place on converted ranches.
29. For larger sociological descriptions of the Brazilian migration to Paraguay, see
SYLVAIN SOUCHAUD, PIONNIERS BRtSILIENS AU PARAGUAY [BRAZILIAN PIONEERS IN
PARAGUAY] (2002) (Fr.), and CARLOS WAGNER, BRASIGUAIOS: HOMENS SEM PATRIA
[BRAZIGUAYANS: MEN WITHOUT A COUNTRY] (1990) (Braz.).
30. See Richard Weisskoff, The Paraguayan Agro-Export Model of Development, 20
WORLD DEV. 1531, 1532-33 (1992).
31. I prefer to use the Spanish word "campesino" rather than the common English
translation "peasant," because it is a term that people use to describe their political and
ethnic identity in Paraguay as much as their economic activity.
32. See generally BASILIO NIKIPHOROFF, EL SUBDESARROLLO RURAL PARAGUAYO-LA
PROBLEMATICA ALGODONERA [RURAL PARAGUAYAN UNDERDEVELOPMENT-THE COTTON
PROBLEM] 31-43 (Intercontinental ed., 1994) (Para.) (detailing the state of landholding by
small cotton farmers in Paraguay).
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eastern frontier areas closer to Brazil.33 They brought agricultural
inputs from Brazil and sold their products there, using the long, poorly
controlled border as points of transfer. They relied on Brazilian
expertise, Brazilian laboratories, Brazilian regulatory guidelines, and
Brazilian crushing facilities and shippers but were constrained by none
of them. This absence of constraint was one of the primary reasons
many of them had come to Paraguay in the first place, along with
nonexistent taxes and cheap, available land. Most of the transnational
corporations that serviced the sector avoided Asunci6n entirely and set
up head offices in Ciudad del Este, the border city that is reputed to be
one of the largest thoroughfares of contraband in the world. Poorer rural
Paraguayans were enrolled in the sector primarily as laborers. As far as
the soy sector was concerned, the Paraguayan state was backward and
populist in a way that occasionally stirred up xenophobia, agitating the
rural labor force. But it was also easily ignored. Under this
arrangement, the soy sector grew to be an important part of the
national economy but also remained separate from it and relatively
independent from state interference.
Paraguayan soybeans were always a border phenomenon, made
possible by the stark regulatory differences between Brazil and
Paraguay. This first kind of translation is therefore a form of arbitrage,
a speculative gamble that derives profit from moving an object between
different regimes of value. 34 Brazil had the industrial infrastructure
while Paraguay had the cheap land. Brazil had access to markets made
possible by long-standing regulatory developments, and Paraguay had
low taxation. Brazil had expertise while Paraguay had soft law. The key
actors here were also border subjects: Brazilians residing in Paraguay
(known early by the pejorative label "Brasiguaios') who were uniquely
positioned to take advantage of the resources on both sides.
In the 1990s, these two competing crops underwent transformations
that rearticulated the networks that supported them. For a variety of
political, economic, and ecological reasons, the cotton harvest declined
precipitously, plunging smallholders into deepening poverty while
disarticulating them from their allies in a government mired in
33. See Andrew Nickson, Brazilian Colonization of the Eastern Border Region of
Paraguay, 13 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 111, 111, 126 (1981); SouCHAuD, supra note 29.
34. I take arbitrage in a general sense as a form of translation, which allows one to profit
from the gap between the apparent sameness of a commodity across contexts and its
contextual difference. See HIRoKAzu MIYAZAKI, ARBITRAGING JAPAN: DREAMS OF CAPITALISM
AT THE END OF FINANCE 30 (2013). For other examples of this usage, see ADRIANA PETRYNA,
WHEN EXPERIMENTS TRAVEL: CLINICAL TRIALS AND THE GLOBAL SEARCH FOR HUMAN
SUBJECTS 83 (2009).
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democratic transition, financial crisis, and austerity politics. 35 Soybeans
went through the opposite process, as the infrastructure for soybean
production (all of it privately owned, and most of it run in Portuguese)
increased throughout the 1990s, along with global prices for raw
soybeans. Paraguay remained relatively isolated from common soybean
pests, and cheap land and fertile soil continued to give farmers there a
comparative advantage over neighboring countries. But it was really the
arrival in 1999 of genetically-modified (GM) soybeans that dramatically
complexified the network and enhanced the comparative advantage that
Brazilian migrants could exploit in Paraguay. 36
Roundup Ready soy was created by Monsanto for the U.S. soy belt
in 1996 and was wildly successful because of its benefits for weed
control.37 Able to resist applications of Roundup, a broad-spectrum
herbicide, farmers could now clean their fields of weeds while the plants
were growing with a simple pass of a crop duster. But the primary
reason Monsanto, a chemical company, even branched into seed
development at all has to do with U.S. patent law. Monsanto was
looking to fill an earnings gap that was about to be created when its
patent expired on Roundup (its brand name for glyphosate herbicide),
its most profitable single product. 38 The company could now control the
distribution of soybean seeds in the United States, but more
importantly, it could bind farmers into contracts that would keep them
buying Roundup from Monsanto rather than generic glyphosate from
anyone else.39 Legislation that allowed them to patent gene-modification
processes in the United States now made it possible to leverage profits
from Roundup through a patent on soybeans rather than on the
chemical itself.40
Without legal protections in Paraguay, Monsanto had no way of
reaping profits from the use of its technology there and did not have so
35. KREGG HETHERINGTON, GUERRILLA AUDITORS: THE POLITICS OF TRANSPARENCY IN
NEOLIBERAL PARAGUAY 29-32 (2011).
36. See Hetherington, supra note 24, at 71, 73, for a more detailed discussion of the
relative changes in these crops.
37. Christine M. Du Bois & Ivan Sergio Freire de Sousa, Genetically Engineered Soy, in
THE WORLD OF SOY, supra note 2, at 75.
38. MARIE-MONIQUE ROBIN, THE WORLD ACCORDING TO MONSANTO: POLLUTION,
CORRUPTION, AND THE CONTROL OF OUR FooD SUPPLY 69-70 (2010).
39. See id. at 205.
40. The landmark case in the U.S. was Diamond vs. Chakrabarty, 443 U.S. 303 (1980),
which, in allowing a genetic engineer working for General Electric to patent an engineered
bacterium, "facilitated the rapid emergence and development of the biotechnology or 'life
sciences' industry." ABBY J. KINCHY, SEEDS, SCIENCE, AND STRUGGLE: THE GLOBAL
POLITICS OF TRANSGENIC CROPS 104 (2012).
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much as a representative in the country until the early 2000s.41 Indeed,
until 2005, it was actually illegal to plant genetically modified
organisms of any kind in Paraguay. 42 But the soybeans ended up there
anyway, carried first to Argentina and then finally smuggled into
Paraguay in unmarked white bags by Argentine seed vendors to be used
alongside generic glyphosate. As Laura Foster highlights in her
contribution to this volume, intellectual property (IP) regulation works
by purifying and controlling, reducing the complex social histories of an
organism to the presence or absence of a single gene.43 But moments of
reductive translation also create the conditions by which organisms are
able to create vast new networks around themselves. This of course is
the point for a company that wishes to produce value, and this
proliferation happens in ways that are neither completely planned nor
controllable.
Once translated into this new situation, the soybeans articulated
with different sorts of actors and networks, empowering new processes
and soon exploding out into the Paraguayan frontier at a rate of 200,000
hectares per year.44 At least one of the conditions causing this was
differential regulation. Paraguay's ban on planting GM seeds was copied
from a similar ban in, Brazil, with the primary difference being that,
having long been embedded in the soybean production chain, the
Brazilian state actually had the phytosanitary infrastructure to enforce
its ban.45 Given the absence of this infrastructure, Brazilians planting
soy in Paraguay had another difference to arbitrage.46 The increased use
of pesticides associated with the beans also attracted regulatory
pressure in Brazil and Argentina but not, in the first years, in
Paraguay. So it was precisely the lack of a body like SENAVE, indeed
41. It still seems likely that the company was fully aware of the contraband
introduction of its seeds into the country, and many Paraguayans, including critics and
promoters of the industry, argue that it promoted the smuggling in the hopes that it would
later be able to change Paraguayan law in its favor, which is exactly what happened.
42. STELLA SEMINO ET AL., GRUPO DE REFLExI6N RURAL, PARAGUAY SOJERO: SOY
EXPANSION AND ITS VIOLENT ATTACK ON LOcAL AND INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES IN
PARAGUAY 16 (Nina Holland ed., 2006), available at http://www.non-gm-farmers.com/doc
uments/Paraguayreport.pdf.
43. See generally Laura A. Foster, Critical Cultural Translation: A Socio-Legal
Framework for Regulatory Orders, 21 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 79 (2014).
44. See CAPECO, http://www.tera.com.py/capeco (last visited Mar. 8, 2014) (Para.).
45. Ivan Sergio Freire de Sousa & Lawrence Busch, Standards and State-Building:
The Construction of Soybean Standards in Brazil, in AGRICULTURAL STANDARDS: THE
SHAPE OF THE GLOBAL FOOD AND FIBER SYSTEM 125-35 (Jim Bingen & Lawrence Busch
eds., 2006) (Neth.).
46. Although Argentina did not have a similar ban, high export taxes (thirty-five
percent on unprocessed soybeans compared with zero percent in Paraguay) made the
difference there.
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the lack of an effective state of any sort, combined with the presence of a
population of Brazilians and Brazilian descendants living on the border,
that made soybeans in this period so extraordinarily profitable.
. At the field level, the soybeans helped articulate both economic and
political relationships. What Roundup Ready soybeans really did for
Paraguayan farmers of a certain scale was allow them to simplify their
weed-control programs, reducing the complexity of chemical inputs and
machinery by allowing them to spray glyphosate whenever a problem
presented itself. By extension, it also reduced the most fickle inputs,
seasonal and . day labor, usually hired from nearby campesino and
indigenous communities to help control weeds. Soy farmers won twice:
they got much higher returns on the crop, and they enhanced their
separation from the Paraguayan state by cutting off their dependence
on its clients. The boom of soybeans was, in equal measure, a horror for
campesinos, who saw rural jobs drop off precipitously at the same time
as deforestation and clouds of noxious chemicals became a standard
part of the landscape, precipitating a further exodus of smallholders. 47
Soy quickly became the focal point for a latent sense of the injustice of
being rural and poor. 48 For this reason, it is not surprising that, during
the first decade of the twenty-first century, organized campesino groups
all but declared war on soybeans, claiming that soy killed and trying to
expunge it from the territory.4 9 Though they might not have been a
matter of concern for Paraguay's regulators, soybeans had already
bifurcated in the popular imagination and become the thing of an
increasingly intense ontological politics in which soybeans were both
singular and doubled. They were, depending on whom one asked, either
"green gold" or "killer beans."50 Both of these ways of speaking were
allegories about soybeans, but, more to the point, both were ways of
describing one's relationship to them, relationships that remained
distinct.51
47. See Jost NICOLAS MORINIGO ALCARAZ, AUGE DE LA PRODUCCI6N RURAL Y CRISIS
CAMPESINA [THE RISE OF RURAL PRODUCTION AND THE PEASANT CRISIS] 59 (2009) (Para.);
Kregg Hetherington, Privatizing the Private in Rural Paraguay: Precarious Lots and the
Materiality of Rights, 36 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 224, 224 (2009). See generally ENCLAVE SOJERO:
MERMA DE SOBERANIA Y POBREZA [SOYBEAN ENCLAVE: POVERTY AND THE DECREASE OF
SOVEREIGNTY] (Ram6n B. Fogel & Marcial Riquelme, eds., 2005) (Para.).
48. I mean this in the phenomenological sense described by Shklar as that "subjective
sense of injustice and the sentiments that make us cry out. for revenge." JUDITH N.
SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 49 (1990).
49. See Hetherington, supra note 24, at 65.
50. Hetherington, supra note 24, at 80.
51. See generally JOHN LAw, AFTER METHOD: MESS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
(2004) (arguing that all knowledge is allegorical, creating understanding by weaving a
relationship between unlike elements).
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III. SECOND TRANSLATION: COMMODITIES AND INFORMATION
The situation I have just described was viable for only a relatively
short period, and the rapid proliferation of connections it generated also
created pressure both within and without for new actors to become part
of the assemblage. The next phase of soybean expansion in Paraguay
resembles what Michel Callon calls "problematization," a form of
translation in which different actors attempted to define the
relationships around soybeans "in such a way as to establish themselves
as an obligatory passage point in the network of relationships they were
building."52 That obligatory passage point would be SENAVE. It was
originally proposed and designed by the Inter-American Development
Bank in 1994, but it was not until a decade later that the necessary
constellation of alliances came together to make it a reality. 53
While Paraguayan soy remained relatively isolated from
government view, international pressure was mounting for countries to
update their phytosanitary regimes and harmonize standards, primarily
with the rest of the region and with the European Union. The
Rotterdam Convention of 1998 created a framework for increased
communication about dangerous chemicals among signatories,
developing regional controls for such pesticides as endosulfan, widely
used in Paraguay in the 1990s. 54 The United Nations Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the Inter-American Institute for
Cooperation in Agriculture (IICA) both made repeated presentations to
the Paraguayan government about the need to bring Paraguay in line
with the Codex Alimentarius and World Trade Organization guidelines
about information sharing. In 2003, responding to these pressures, the
Mercosur trading block (composed of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and
Paraguay) established a regional organization for harmonizing
phytosanitary regulations across borders.55 For each of these groups,
52. Michel Callon, Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the
Scallops and the Fishermen of St Brieuc Bay, in POWER, ACTION AND BELIEF: A NEW
SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE? 196, 204 (John Law ed., 1986).
53. See Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, I Fase Programa de Diversificaci6n y
Modernizaci6n del Sector Agropecuario [Phase I Program of Diversification and
Modernization of the Agricultural Sector], ATN/JF-4528-PR (May 18, 1994) (on file with
the InterAmerican Development Bank).
54. Hebe Gonzales de Bobeda, La situacidn de los plaguicidas en el Paraguay [The
Pesticide Situation in Paraguay], in SIMPOSIO INTERNACIONAL SOBRE INSECTICIDAS,
PLAGUICIDAS Y DESECHOS TOxiCOS EN EL PARAGUAY [INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON
INSECTICIDES, PESTICIDE, AND Toxic WASTE IN PARAGUAY] 178, 182 (Organizaci6n
Panamericana de la Salud ed., 1994) (Para.).
55. See COMITE REGIONAL DE SANIDAD VEGETAL DEL CONO SUR [REGIONAL COMMITTEE
ON OF PLANT PROTECTION FOR THE SOUTHERN CONE ], ESTANDAR REGIONAL EN
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Paraguay's lack of a functioning phytosanitary agency was compounded
by an almost complete lack of technical infrastructure for producing
standardized information.
For these actors, the period of 1999-2004 was one of frustration and
failure to link their interests to the soybeans. These five years,
associated with the government of Luis Gonzdlez Macchi, were years of
deep political and economic crisis for Paraguay.5 6 None of the
international pressure created regulatory changes until a new
executive, headed by Nicanor Duarte Frutos, took office in August 2004.
Although of the same traditional Colorado Party as his predecessor,
Duarte Frutos presented himself convincingly as a technocrat, and, in
the first months of his mandate, built an entourage of people known for
their ethical economic behavior.5 7 A key figure here was Ronaldo Dietze,
a representative of Paraguay's most powerful farming cooperatives and
trained in agrarian administration in Germany. It was Dietze who
translated between international conventions and local farmers'
interests, and drafted the legislation necessary to finally bring SENAVE
into being.58
What made Dietze's gambit successful was that the international
bodies mentioned above were not the only ones pressuring for change. If
the soy sector had benefited from a comparative lack of regulation in the
first few years, it did not take long for the industry to start preparing to
regulate themselves, primarily in the hopes of expanding its market
beyond Brazil. The first step of market expansion required that
Paraguayan producers be able to participate in the certification rituals
that might make Paraguayan soy acceptable to foreign buyers,
particularly from the European Union. This push would be led by large-
scale players in the industry, who no longer benefited directly from the
lawlessness of the soybean trade and who wanted to be taken seriously
at the international level. For them, the need for larger markets now
PROTECCION FITOSANITARIA [REGIONAL STANDARD FOR PLANT PROTECTION] § 3.15, at 1, 4
(2003) (Arg.).
56. GonzAlez Macchi went from being president of the Senate to president of the
republic overnight after sitting president Cubas Grau was exiled at the very beginning of
his mandate for his presumed role in the assassination of his own vice president. GonzAlez
Macchi had no credibility and little ability to govern, which is one of the reasons that the
state did very little to respond to soybean expansion during his mandate. See
HETHERINGTON, supra note 13, at 57-60.
57. Id. at 59-60.
58. Like many people who rose to prominence under Duarte Frutos, Dietze was not
part of the primary political structures of the two main political parties. Instead, he had
become senator as part of a new party representing business interests and transparency.
As an engineer and successful farmer, he had made his name as a neutral technocrat, and
while he was an outsider to Paraguayan nationalist politics, he was a descendant-and
this was key-not of Brazilians, but of Germans.
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outstripped the benefits of regulatory arbitrage. And for this they
needed a new bean that could be more effectively commodified.69
As an illustration of these interests, it suffices to tell the odd story
about how GM soybeans came to be legalized. In 2004, Monsanto,
annoyed at what it saw as patent infringement but incapable of openly
dealing with the Paraguayan government, managed, nonetheless, to get
soy farmers to agree to pay a substantial royalty (four percent) directly
to the company for the use of the illegal technology.60 The royalty deal
between Monsanto and the UGP, facilitated by Dietze, showed the
degree to which soybean producers were willing to be brought into costly
hierarchical relationships of control if doing so might increase their
credibility with multinational corporations and, finally, with overseas
buyers. Most amazingly, the deal involved the Ministry of Agriculture
(the same Ministry charged with enforcing the ban against the very
GMOs that would be subject to royalty payment), who agreed to enforce
the royalty payments.61 One month later, the government passed a
special law legalizing the cultivation of GM soybeans in recognition of a
material fait accompli in the countryside.62 Yet, another month later,
the government created SENAVE, which could certify for exporters that
the royalty had been paid.
SENAVE was a consolidation of a number of disorganized
cientilistic agencies that became the competent agency for international
communication about all things phytosanitary. Once in place, it
attracted funding from IICA, FAO, and Japanese and German
development agencies to build up its network of laboratories and
training seminars. But more to the point, because it was financed by
fees levied on wealthy producers, SENAVE was able to garner an
enormous operating budget (by Paraguayan standards). SENAVE
quickly extended its infrastructure throughout the countryside, setting
up regional offices, border inspection points, laboratories, and
certification programs.
59. The primary lobby group for the soy industry, the Union de Gremios Productivos
(UGP), did of course continue to strongly oppose things like export taxation or land reform
on which the speculation also depended. But this period also complexilied the UGP's
interests as well, forcing it to walk a fine line between populist anti-regulation positions in
line with one kind of soybean, while it pushed for the creation of a more regular soybean
on the other.
60. SEMINO, supra note 42, at 17.
61. Id. at 18.
62. ROBIN, supra note 38, at 276. The special provision for Roundup Ready soybeans
was not extended to other genetically modified organisms, which would henceforth have to
go through a complicated approval process, and this would become one of the many
terrains of struggle under Lugo's government.
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It is important here to differentiate what the soybean farmers
thought they were doing in creating SENAVE from what the FAO
thought it was doing. While the projects were coordinated through the
canny translations of brokers like Dietze, they were clearly not the
same. International agreements treat this form of regulation as a
framework for trade. That is, regulation is separate from the
commodities themselves, merely producing the conditions for their
movement. Regulation effects this separation through the concept of
information; that is, the object of regulation is not a thing per se but its
representation. 63 In this case, the harmonization of standards not only
reduces things like soybeans to an objective singularity; it translates
them into quantifiable units of communication within a larger system of
harmonized language. We could call this the cybernetic model of
regulation that posits the relationship between frame and object as
analogous to the relationship between system and signal. In this
framing practice, the global commodities market is produced and made
optimally efficient by the reduction of noisy complexities to
interpretable, quantifiable units of information. 64
Regulators' self-description is closely mirrored by a critical
literature that sees standards as a practice of disciplining through
visibility.65 Elizabeth Dunn's work on the European Union's regulatory
effects on Poland's food industry is exemplary here. Dunn argues that
regulatory harmonization needs to be seen as producing certain kinds of
human subjects.66 By increasing the legibility of certain labor practices
to importing jurisdiction, the regulatory production of facts about the
food industry creates a normative hierarchy in which the practices of
63. For a discussion of the separation of world from representation in modernist
governmental epistemology, see generally TIMOTHY MITCHELL, RULE OF EXPERTS: EGYPT,
TECHNO-POLITICS, MODERNITY (2002).
64. For a critique of the cybernetic model of development, based on the relationship
between units of information and systems, see PHILIP MIROWSKI, MACHINE DREAMS:
ECONOMICS BECOMES A CYBORG SCIENCE (2002); Kregg Hetherington, Promising
Information: Democracy, Development, and the Remapping of Latin America, 41 ECON. &
SOC'Y 127 (2012).
65. This literature draws on Foucault's original work on regimes of visibility, and has
become a common line of critique for standard-making practices and regimes of state
surveillance in general. See, e.g., JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN
SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED (1998); Arun Agrawal,
Environmentality: Community, Intimate Government, and the Making of Environmental
Subjects in Kumaon, India, 46 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 161 (2005). See generally
MICHAEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan
trans., Pantheon Books 1977) (1975).
66. Elizabeth Dunn, Standards and Person-Making in East Central Europe, in GLOBAL
ASSEMBLAGES: TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND ETHICS AS ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 173
(Aihwa Ong & Stephen J. Collier eds., 2005)
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peripheral players in the market can be disciplined to more closely
approximate those imagined to be in Western Europe.67 Indeed, though
not subject to harmonization in the same way as Poland might be, the
softer work of the FAO and IICA to bring Paraguay into the orbit of EU
standards is quite closely related to it. So too was the hope I often heard
voiced by urban activists, who thought that once SENAVE was run by
someone like Lovera, it would be able to finally reveal, and thereby
curb, all of the shady dealings going on in the soy industry. Their hope
closely mirrored the project to reform Paraguayan soy producers in the
mold of supposedly more transparent European subjects.68
That SENAVE did have an important effect on curbing certain
practices (like pesticide smuggling) speaks to the disciplinary power of
these normative understandings of information. And yet, neither of
these versions of the power of information captures what soy farmers
were up to when they chose to lobby so hard and pay so much to create
the agency. For them, SENAVE's disciplinary role was secondary.
SENAVE was equipped to produce large quantities of restricted data
about agricultural production but very little in the way of grand
representations that make visible its inner workings. Its mandate was
in no way to "see like a state" in any grand way, nor was it equipped to
produce critical facts about the industry for outsiders. Instead, it was
almost exclusively about helping the industry deal with its increasing
quantities of soybeans by allowing them to be articulated into other
markets and practices. For instance, establishing new standards about
humidity and purity made it much easier for multinational corporations
like Cargill and Dreyfus to build silos, container fleets, and, later,
industrial crushing facilities throughout the country, dramatically
expanding the number of large-scale buyers available to soy farmers.
But perhaps more importantly, certification of phytosanitary purity
according to International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
guidelines (once SENAVE was accredited) made it much easier to find
overseas buyers for grains, since they could already be certified to meet
the standards for purity and humidity demanded by importing
jurisdictions.
From the industry perspective, a more useful way of thinking about
such certification schemes is not that they produce legible facts about
soybeans, but rather that they qualify soybeans and make them able to
67. ELIzABETH C. DUNN, PRIVATIZING POLAND: BABY FOOD, BIG BUSINESS, AND THE
REMAKING OF LABOR (2004);; see also ANDREw BARRY, POLITICAL MACHINEs: GOVERNING A
TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (2001).
68. There is a certain irony here since most people involved in Lovera's group would
balk at the imperialist undertones of this statement, and in slightly different contexts
articulate deep criticisms of Western-styled industrial agriculture.
REGULAR SOYBEANS
do things they could not do prior to the availability of qualifying ritual.
To adopt a phrase from Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent and Isabelle
Stengers, what the test does is produce informed soybeans, matter
augmented by information.69 An informed soybean is a soybean that
comes accompanied by a piece of paper with legible data whose
production has been certified (using stamps, signatures and an
authoritative form) by a state representative. While the bean may have
the exact chemical composition of any other bean, it is also something
more, augmented by the nearby presence of the form, with its numbers
and stamps. If, as Latour has said, a fact is a state of the world loaded
into a statement, then what an agency like SENAVE does is load
statements back into states of the world.70 The certificates are based on
representational practices, but they are representations that never
travel far from their referents. Rather, they improve soybeans to make
them capable of passing very particular sorts of trials: import
inspections in other jurisdictions. Informed soybeans store better, travel
better, win the approval of clients better, and generally make for a
much better, more versatile commodity. Indeed, most people I have
spoken to (including inspectors, farmers, and lobbyists, as well as their
critics) acknowledge that, in the period prior to Lovera's presidency and
while the UGP controlled policy making in the boardroom of SENAVE,
all parties understood that on-farm inspections were opportunities for
bribery. In both legitimate and illegitimate ways, the UGP was said to
"own" SENAVE,71 which, in their perspective, seemed less like a state
agency than like a rather prosaic piece of the export chain.
IV. THIRD TRANSLATION: THE STATE AND HUMAN BODIES
The creation of SENAVE proved to be a very effective strategy for
the commodification of soybeans, and the years after it was inaugurated
saw multinational corporations such as Cargill and Dreyfus setting up
silos, crushing facilities, and ports throughout the countryside and
along all major highways. And yet, SENAVE did not only enact
69. BERNADETTE BENSAUDE-VINCENT & ISABELLE STENGERS, A HISTORY OF CHEMISTRY
(Deborah van Dam trans., Harvard University Press 1996) (1993); see also Andrew Barry,
Materialist Politics: Metallurgy, in POLITICAL IVIATTER: TECHNOSCIENCE, DEMOCRACY, AND
PUBLIC LIFE 89 (Bruce Braun & Sarah J. Whatmore eds., 2010).
70. BRUNO LATOUR, Circulating Reference, in PANDORA'S HOPE: ESSAYS ON THE
REALITY OF SCIENCE STUDIES 24, 48 (1999).
71. Nickson and Lambert make the argument that during the 1990s (and I would say
thereafter), institutional reformers in Paraguay had to deal with the long legacy of
oligarchies treating the state as their private property. SENAVE falls very much into this
category. Andrew Nickson & Peter Lambert, State Reform and the 'Privatized State' in
Paraguay, 22 PUB. ADMIN. & DEv. 163, 167 (2002).
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soybeans as commodities. In less obvious ways, by building up the
phytosanitary capabilities of the state, soybeans also came to be
understood increasingly as plants (rather than only as commodities)
whose regulatory interests and problems fell into the same category as
other plants that concerned humans. Through its categorization as a
plant, soybeans became entangled in a whole other set of associations
that were less obviously beneficial to the industry.
The very concept of "phytosanitary regulation" is a fickle bundle of
concerns, at least two of which were inconvenient for the soy industry:
border control and food safety. First, SENAVE was designed to frame a
very particular scale-that of the nation-state-in which a centralized
bureaucracy can control the movement of objects and people across
terrestrial borders. Much of the international energy put into
international phytosanitary agreements in the 1990s was meant to
counterbalance the new pest vectors opened up by increased trade. 72 It
is worth remembering that the first phytosanitary measure (and still
among its most common-and bluntest-instruments) was the
quarantine, whereby central states could at least attempt to prevent the
passage of plant pests from one agricultural area into another. 73 This
same logic would be applied to agrichemicals under the Rotterdam
Convention of 1998. So while phytosanitary agreements were pushed as
"trade enabling," they accomplished this primarily by encouraging
tighter state control over the movement of plants and chemicals. Soy
farmers who reviled the state now found themselves paying substantial
fees to have state actors nose around in their business. The agency may
have been seen as the private property of the soy industry in real terms,
but it nonetheless implied converting beans that had once thrived on a
porous land border into a properly national sort of thing.
The second bundle of concerns was even more delicate. Another
major impulse for phytosanitary regulation came from increased
concerns in Europe in the 1990s over food safety. 74 Although soybeans
grown in Paraguay do enter the human food chain, mostly as chemical
derivatives, or as meats derived from animals raised on soy meal, they
are not consumed fresh and are therefore subject to almost no controls
72. Most new international agreements came out of agreements between the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). See DAVID L.
EBBELS, PRINCIPLES OF PLANT HEALTH AND QUARANTINE 33 (2003).
73. See generally id.
74. For a discussion of the "monstrous topicality" that linked GM soybeans to mad cow
disease and other food scares in Europe, see SARAH WHATMORE, HYBRID GEOGRAPHIES 120
(2002). In fact, the same activist networks that raised the alarm about genetically
modified organisms in Europe were involved in publicizing campesino critiques of
soybeans in Paraguay, and in propagating the slogan that "soy kills." See Hetherington,
supra note 24, at 78.
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themselves as food objects. 75 Indeed, part of the frustration of soy
farmers about the GMO scares of the early 2000s in Paraguay was that
they seemed to be based on the belief that people would be eating large
quantities of GMOs, which they generally were not.76 SENAVE's
regulation of the soybean is entirely in agreement with the soy lobby
itself. SENAVE officially claims that soybeans do not pose a serious
problem as food. But according to the logic of phytosanitary regulation,
concerns that are appropriate to soybeans (such as silo humidity
standards) are dealt with by the same agencies as concerns about toxic
residues on imported tomatoes sold in local markets. At the very least,
since files about pesticide residues on tomatoes sit on the same desk as
files about silo humidity, whether or not the connection is made depends
to some extent on the person sitting at the desk. During Lovera's tenure
at SENAVE, one of the great controversies would be whether soybeans
needed to be linked to the Ministry of Public Health.77
That this association between soybeans and health was
controversial can be seen in the legal documents going back to the early
1990s, when the Ministry of Public Heath became involved in legislative
pushes to control pesticide use.78 Before and after its creation, the soy
lobby haggled with other parties over whether SENAVE ought to
facilitate input from the Ministry of Public Health and the Secretariat of
the Environment into decisions about certifying GMOs or whether these
should remain decisions exclusively of SENAVE. Lovera would
ultimately fail to formalize the link, but informal lines of
communication between his office and the Ministry of Public Health
remained strong throughout his mandate, as did his determination to
reframe plant health in terms of human health.79
75. See Ivan Sergio Freire de Sousa & Rita de Cissia Milagres Teixeira Vieira,
Soybeans and Soyfoods in Brazil, with Notes on Argentina: Sketch of an Expanding World
Commodity, in THE WORLD OF SOY, supra note 2, at 234.
76. The exception to this rule were the occasional times soy farmers donated large
quantities of milk to schools as part of a local campaign to make themselves appear more
generous.
77. This was all the more complicated politically for the UGP since if there was one
success under Lugo that attracted almost universal support and admiration it was his
reform of the Ministry of Public Health and the proliferation of health services in the
countryside. The otherwise tangential detail that Lovera was on very good terms with the
popular new Minister of Public Health, Esperanza Martinez, became quite important in
this context.
78. See, e.g., ORGANIZACION PANAMERICANA DE LA SALUD [PAN-AMERIcAN HEALTH
ORGANIZATION], SIMPOSIO INTERNACIONAL SOBRE INSECTICIDAS, PLAGUICIDAS Y DESECHOS
TOXICOS EN EL PARAGUAY [INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON INSECTICIDES, PESTICIDES, AND
Toxic WASTE IN PARAGUAY] (1993) (Para.).
79. The approval body for genetically modified organisms, the Comit6 de Bioseguridad,
was made of representatives from different ministries and agencies. In the end, the
75
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Since the expansion of soybeans had become controversial, the case
to garner the most public outrage against the sector was the poisoning
death of Silvino Talavera, an eight-year-old boy who was sprayed by a
crop duster on his way home from school.80 While cases like this one
were widely rumored to have occurred throughout the countryside, this
was the first one in which a team of activists and lawyers managed to
get medical proof, in the form of tests on the boy's blood-performed in
Buenos Aires-that pesticides killed him. Linking pesticides to the body
of a child made the case emblematic in the public sphere of the dangers
of soybeans and the arrogance of the industry. 1 There were of course
epidemiological nuances here that the soy lobby was always happy to
point out even a decade later: Silvino's reaction to exposure was
exacerbated by malnourishment and other diseases of poverty that were
not precisely the fault of the farmers who had exposed him to pesticides.
But the very fact that this argument was made shows just how ethically
weak their position had become.
Shortly after the Silvino case went public, the Ministry of
Agriculture put a new pesticide law in place that required farmers to
plant barrier vegetation between their fields and the houses of their
neighbors. 82 It was a hastily-devised and difficult to enforce regulation,
but it became part of the conversation from that point onward. The
same year, a task force was established with the help of IICA and FAO
to study Paraguay's pesticide regulations, and this task force eventually
recommended an overhaul of legislation covering the use of
agrichemicals, including tougher penalties and restrictions. The task
force's discussion was influenced in part by the Talavera controversy
and was highly unpopular with the soy lobby, which was able to have it
scuttled in the Senate and replaced with their own less restrictive Law
2457/09. In response to this political play in the legislature, Lugo named
Miguel Lovera to head the SENAVE, who in turn called Silvia Gonzalez,
the lead lawyer on the Silvino Talavera case, and a good friend of the
Ministry of Public Health's main epidemiologist. Lovera asked her to
head SENAVE's legal department. She immediately began, among other
things, to draft a decree that would increase the restrictiveness of law
2457/09 by redefining its key terms (e.g. barrier, notification,
neighborhood). The regulation could bypass the Senate because it did
Ministry of Public Health would be represented only by the National Institute of
Nutrition, rather than those institutes concerned with the consequences of pesticide use.
80. See Hetherington, supra note 24, at 78.
81. See id. at 79.
82. Decreto No. 2.048/04, 26 de Marzo de 2004 (Para.), available at http://www.senave.
gov.py/docs/decretos/Dto2048-04.pdf.
REGULAR SOYBEANS
not need to be passed as a law but only as a decree of the Minister of
Agriculture.
What all of these minute details of regulatory haggling underline is
just how much all of the actors understood regulation and standard
setting as a site of innovation (to use Yasmine Chahed's term from her
contribution to this collection). But they were not merely innovating in
the realm of policy. Under Lovera's administration, we can see yet
another bean emerging, if only partially, one that is linked to concerns
about the effects of pesticide use on human health. All of this was made
possible by the fact that the overriding regulatory framework to emerge
in the period of soybean commodification also treated soybeans as plants
and food objects. Since SENAVE had already effected a
reterritorialization of soybeans, framing them in national terms, it
seemed plausible to think that they would become ever more entwined
with human bodies through regulatory relationships between the
ministries of Agriculture and Public Health. The UGP pulled out all the
stops to try to prevent GonzAlez from interfering with the pesticide
legislation and managed to convince the Minister of Agriculture not to
sign it. Instead of passing a decree, then, Lovera turned it into a
"resolution," an inferior layer of law signed by the head of the
institution rather than the Minister that could dictate how inspectors
were to interpret the law.83 It is telling that when Lovera was turfed by
the new government in June 2012, one of the first acts of the new
president of SENAVE was to tell his inspectors that this resolution was
no longer in effect. The new president never bothered to officially
overturn it because it was simply understood that, in the climate of the
coup, he could if he wanted to.
V. THE ONTOLOGICAL POLITICS OF A COUP
Had president Lugo not been deposed, and had Lovera and his team
not been sacked from SENAVE, a rather different analysis might have
been tempting. Lugo had come to power on a promise of a more
equitable society with tighter controls on environmental and economic
exploitation, using the power of the regulatory framework to turn a
longstanding critique of the soy sector into an instrument for limiting
and containing. In that light, small acts of regulatory tinkering were
bound to be a disappointment to the activist supporters of his
government. The story I have just told about trying to couple soybeans
to bureaucratic processes in the Ministry of Public Health could be
83. Resoluciones del SENAVE, No. 550, 21 de Julio de 2011 (Para.), available at http://
www.senave.gov.py/docs/resoluciones/senave/Res550-11.pdf.
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supplemented by many others about chemistry lab equipment
purchasing agreements and community mapping practices. If one
wishes to evaluate regulatory practices as creating frameworks that
contain and thereby control soybeans understood as a singular kind of
stable object, then none of these efforts could be deemed successful. If,
however, we see each of these attempts as enrolling new relationships
into the soybean assemblage and making the soybeans capable of new
things, we are able to ask a whole new set of questions, much closer, I
think, to what Lovera asked himself when he took over SENAVE and
the UGP was asking itself when it pressured for a coup.
Soybeans had, after all, become a mega-crop in Paraguay only
because of their uncanny ability, with Brazilian migrants, to make
speculative connections across the regulatory differences straddling
Paraguay's borders. The UGP worked hard to build SENAVE, enrolling
new relationships to help produce a more robust soybean for
international markets, only to see yet another bean emerge, a
nationalist bean that respected borders and colluded with the state. All
of this made soybeans fickle but powerful things, ontologically cunning
things that promised riches even as they warned of how many other
things they might become. What emerged from the meetings between
SENAVE and the Minister of Public Health was the possibility of a new
bean, one irreducibly connected to the health of the rural poor. Such a
bean might thrive, not on the exclusion of human bodies like that of
Silvino Talavera-malnourished, exhausted, and, finally, poisoned-but
on its connection to them, and, as such, seriously undermine the
economic projects that were built around them.
Whether it is successful or not in refraining soybeans so as to keep
them distinct from the concerns of sickened human bodies, it is notable
that the moment of framing in this story took place not through
regulation but through an overthrow of government. Only in the light of
the parliamentary coup can one fully appreciate the ontological posture
of the soy lobby and the lengths it was willing to go to maintain control
and to cut the network in the hopes of preventing such new connections
from becoming indispensable. In the post-critical moment that
Paraguayan activists had to contend with when they were elected in
2008, these pragmatic moves of apparently minute regulatory
translation were capable of stirring the fears of a powerful economic
group, not by taking away, but by adding concerns to the thing in
question. For social legal scholars also grappling with the politics of
analysis beyond critique, it is worth remembering what regulation can
make, rather than focusing on what it ought to control.
